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Society has always been concerned with violations of  laws and regulations 
by all types of  entities - business enterprises, nonprofit  organizations, and 
governmental units. Highly publicized accounts of  management improprieties 
reported over the last two decades have caused this concern to increase sig-
nificantly.  Several congressional committees, regulatory agencies, and oth-
ers have suggested that auditors should assume more responsibility for 
detecting and disclosing violations of  laws or regulations, commonly referred 
to as illegal acts. 
Developing standards that articulate the auditor's responsibility for  ille-
gal acts has proven to be a very challenging task for  several reasons. First, 
a large diversity of  laws and regulations affects  most entities, and identifying 
violations of  many of  those laws and regulations requires legal expertise. Sec-
ond, even with this expertise, the complexity of  some laws and regulations 
makes identifying  a violation very difficult.  Finally, even after  an illegal act 
has been identified,  evaluating management's assessment of  its potential ef-
fects  on the entity's financial  statements is also very difficult. 
This article analyzes the auditing standards that describe the auditor's re-
sponsibilities for  detecting and reporting illegal acts. It also reviews the his-
torical developments that have brought the profession  to where it is today. 
Finally, we introduce some future  issues and research needs in this area. 
Historical Developments 
The issue of  the auditor's responsibility for  illegal or questionable acts by 
clients is not new. It first  made front-page  news in the mid 1970's as a result 
of  the Watergate scandal. Investigations led to initial disclosures of  illegal po-
litical contributions by many large corporations. These initial disclosures 
opened the door to a host of  other revelations involving questionable payments 
by corporations to domestic and foreign  government officials.  As a result, the 
profession  formally  addressed the issue of  the auditor's responsibility to de-
tect and report illegal acts by clients. The issue was initially studied by the 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (the Cohen Commission). Based 
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on the Cohen Commission's preliminary recommendations, the AICPA Au-
diting Standards Executive Committee issued SAS No. 17, Illegal  Acts by 
Clients,  in 1977. This statement was the first  professional  standard that specif-
ically addressed the auditor's responsibilities to detect and disclose illegal acts. 
Many of  the concepts in current professional  standards were developed 
by the Cohen Commission. It concluded that the auditor cannot reasonably 
be expected to assume the responsibility to detect and disclose an entity's 
violations of  laws in general because: (1) auditors do not possess the legal 
training to recognize all the complex circumstances and processes that give 
rise to litigation and that suggest its outcome, and (2) many illegal or ques-
tionable acts involve small amounts in relation to the financial  statements. If 
society needs assurance on matters that are principally legal, the Cohen 
Commission concluded that this assurance should be provided by those 
most capable of  doing so, management assisted by its lawyers. 
In discussing the auditor's responsibility, the Cohen Commission ac-
knowledged that certain illegal acts, such as tax evasion, have been well de-
fined  and are easily recognized by experienced auditors. It also introduced 
the concept of  illegal acts that have a direct and material effect  on the amounts 
in the financial  statements, and stated that auditors normally consider the pos-
sibility of  such acts when planning and conducting their audits. 
Consistent with the recommendations of  the Cohen Commission, SAS No. 
17 [AICPA 1977] begins by stating that: 
An examination made in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards cannot be expected to provide assurance that illegal acts will 
be detected. In reporting on financial  statements, an auditor holds him-
self  out as one who is proficient  in accounting and auditing. The de-
termination of  whether an act is illegal is usually beyond his professional 
competence [para .03]. 
The statement goes on to indicate that procedures performed  primarily 
for  the purpose of  expressing an opinion on the financial  statements may bring 
possible illegal acts to the auditor's attention. But the further  removed an il-
legal act is from  the events and transactions specifically  reflected  in the fi-
nancial statements, the less likely the auditor is to become aware of  the act 
or recognize its possible illegality. 
SAS No. 17 also discusses violations of  laws and regulations that have a 
direct effect  on the amounts in the financial  statements. It states that the au-
ditor considers such laws and regulations when planning and conducting the 
audit, and includes as examples tax laws, and laws and regulations affecting 
the amount of  revenue accrued under government contracts. However, SAS 
No. 17 does not set forth  any affirmative  detection responsibility. 
Finally, SAS No. 17 contains guidance for  the auditor when he or she be-
lieves that an illegal act has occurred. The auditor is to obtain an understanding 
of  the nature of  the potential financial  statement effect  by inquiry of  man-
agement, by consultation with legal counsel and, if  necessary, perform  ad-
ditional procedures to investigate the act. If  an act is determined to be illegal, 
the auditor is required to report the circumstances to management person-
nel at a high enough level of  authority so that appropriate action can be 
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taken. In some circumstances, that might be the audit committee of  the 
board of  directors. 
In the mid-to-late 1980's, the issue of  the auditors' responsibility for  ille-
gal acts by clients resurfaced  during the development of  the "expectation gap" 
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). The public and financial  statement 
users believed that auditors should assume more responsibility for  detect-
ing errors and irregularities. This resulted in the Auditing Standards Board's 
reexamination of  the auditor's responsibility for  illegal acts, and the issuance 
of  SAS No. 54, Illegal  Acts by Clients,  which superseded the guidance in SAS 
No. 17. 
Detection Responsibility 
In defining  the auditor's responsibility for  detecting illegal acts, SAS No. 
54 takes the approach of  dividing illegal acts into two broad categories or types. 
For the first  type, illegal acts that have a direct  and material  effect  on line-
item amounts in the financial  statements, the auditor has the same respon-
sibility as for  errors and irregularities. That is, the auditor should design the 
audit to provide reasonable assurance that the financial  statements amounts 
are free  from  material misstatement resulting from  these direct  effect  illegal 
acts. This responsibility is described in SAS No. 53, The  Auditor's  Responsi-
bility to Detect and  Report Errors  and  Irregularities.  In contrast to SAS No. 17, 
SAS No. 54 establishes an affirmative  detection responsibility for  direct  effect 
illegal acts that are material. 
For the second type, SAS No. 54 states that an audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) normally does not include audit 
procedures specifically  designed to detect illegal acts having an indirect  ef-
fect  on financial  statements. The auditor is responsible for  evaluation of  such 
acts only when information  comes to his or her attention suggesting the pos-
sibility that they have occurred. However, SAS No. 54 does note that the au-
ditor should make inquiries of  management about the entity's compliance with 
laws and regulations. When appropriate, the auditor should also inquire of 
management about (1) the entity's policies relative to the prevention of  in-
direct effect  illegal acts, and (2) the use of  directives and periodic represen-
tations obtained from  management about compliance with laws and regulations. 
If  the auditor becomes aware of  information  that raises suspicions, the au-
ditor is obligated to apply additional procedures to determine whether an il-
legal act has, in fact,  occurred. SAS No. 54 reaffirms  the presumption that an 
audit made in accordance with GAAS provides no assurance that indirect  ef-
fect  illegal acts will be disclosed. 
Differentiating  the Types of  Illegal Acts 
Although the concept of  direct and material illegal acts was developed in 
the mid 1970's, auditors are for  the first  time attempting to operationalize the 
concept in audit engagements. SAS No. 54 provides examples of  both direct 
effect  and indirect effect  illegal acts. Apart from  these examples, SAS No. 54 
leaves the issue of  differentiating  direct effect  illegal acts from  indirect effect 
illegal acts largely to auditor judgment. As the AICPA industry committees 
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have attempted to develop guidance about illegal acts for  industry audit and 
accounting guides, it has become apparent that distinguishing direct effect 
from  indirect effect  illegal acts is a challenging practice problem. 
The examples in SAS No. 54 of  direct effect  illegal acts are the same as 
those included in SAS No. 17 - violations of  tax laws that affect  the amount 
of  expense recognized for  the period and violations of  laws and regulations 
that affect  the amount of  revenue accrued under government contracts. Ad-
ditional examples for  entities receiving federal  financial  assistance are pro-
vided in SAS No. 63, Compliance  Auditing  Applicable  to Governmental  Entities 
and  Other Recipients of  Governmental  Financial  Assistance. That statement 
identifies,  in broad categories, the types of  legal requirements that may have 
a direct effect  on the entity's financial  statements. Such laws and regulations 
generally deal with the following  matters: 
• The types of  services that may or may not be purchased with financial 
assistance. 
• The characteristics of  individuals or groups to whom entities may 
give financial  assistance. 
• The amounts entities must contribute from  their own resources to-
wards projects for  which financial  assistance is provided. 
Indirect effect  illegal acts are characterized as being more related to the 
entity's operating aspects than to its financial  and accounting aspects. Examples 
include violations of  laws and regulations related to securities trading, oc-
cupational safety  and health, food  and drug safety,  environmental protection, 
equal employment, and antitrust. The financial  statement effect  of  violations 
of  these acts is normally the contingent liability that may need to be disclosed 
in the financial  statements. For example, securities may be purchased based 
on insider information.  If  the purchase is appropriately recorded, there is no 
direct effect  on the financial  statements. But the indirect effect  - the poten-
tial contingent liability in the form  of  fines  or penalties - may not be disclosed. 
This contingent tail does not make this violation a direct effect  illegal act, even 
if  it meets the criteria for  accrual under Statement of  Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 5, Accounting for  Contingencies. 
All direct effect  laws and regulations have one characteristic in common -
requirements that dictate the manner in which a financial  statement amount 
should be measured or presented. They have provisions that relate to the val-
uation or classification  of  financial  statement revenues or expenses and re-
lated assets or liabilities. Such requirements are akin to those in a royalty 
contract that specify  the way in which royalty expenses and liabilities should 
be measured. According to SAS No. 54, the auditor's concern with compli-
ance with these laws and regulations is derived from  their effect  on financial 
statement amounts, not from  their legality per se. Thus, the auditor's re-
sponsibility runs only to the specific  requirements that affect  the financial  state-
ment amounts. This concept can be illustrated with tax laws and regulations. 
Certain provisions of  the tax code affect  the manner in which an entity's tax 
provision is measured. They have a direct effect  on the financial  statements. 
Other provisions relate to the accurate completion and timely filing  of  tax forms. 
The effect  of  violations of  these provisions is indirect - the contingent 
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liability for  tax penalties. The auditors' responsibility for  this contingency is 
the same as for  other illegal acts that have an indirect effect  on the financial 
statements. 
Auditing the Contingent Tail 
Certain audit procedures performed  for  the purpose of  forming  an opin-
ion on the financial  statements may bring possible violations of  laws and reg-
ulations to the auditor's attention. Examples of  such procedures include 
reading minutes of  meetings of  stockholders and directors and correspon-
dence from  taxing or other governmental agencies, and inspecting documents 
supporting transactions. In auditing litigation, claims, and assessments, the 
auditor performs  the following  procedures that also might disclose illegal acts: 
• Making inquiries of  and discussing with management the policies 
and procedures adopted for  identifying,  evaluating, and accounting 
for  litigation, claims, and assessments. 
• Obtaining from  management a description and evaluation of  litiga-
tion, claims, and assessments, and assurances that all such matters 
have been disclosed in accordance with Statement of  Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 5 (FASB No 5). 
• Examining documents in the client's possession concerning litiga-
tion, claims, and assessments, including correspondence and invoices 
from  lawyers. 
• Obtaining assurance from  management that it has disclosed all 
unasserted claims that the lawyer has advised them are probable 
of  assertion and must be disclosed in accordance with FASB No. 5. 
• Obtaining a response from  the entity's lawyer to a letter of  audit in-
quiry about litigations, claims, and assessments. 
These procedures for  litigation, claims, and assessments provide limited 
evidence of  compliance with laws and regulations. They rely heavily upon man-
agement becoming aware of  a violation and making information  about the 
matter known to the entity's lawyer and the auditor. Other evidence might 
not be available until a governmental agency undertakes an investigation of 
the violation. 
Evaluating the Results of  the Procedures 
If  the auditor's procedures provide an indication that indirect effect  ille-
gal acts may have occurred, SAS No. 54 states that the auditor should obtain 
sufficient  information  about the nature of  the act to evaluate its effect  on the 
financial  statements. Obtaining this information  begins with inquiries of  man-
agement at least one level above those involved. If  satisfactory  information 
is not obtained from  that source, the auditor should consult with the client's 
legal counsel, and apply any additional procedures necessary to obtain an un-
derstanding of  the nature of  the acts. When the auditor concludes, based on 
the information,  that illegal acts have or are likely to have occurred, he or 
she should consider their effects  on the financial  statements as well as the 
implications for  other aspects of  the audit. 
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Indirect effect  illegal acts typically result in unasserted claims against the 
entity. In determining the appropriate financial  statement presentation of  an 
unasserted claim, management refers  to FASB No. 5. That statement re-
quires management, assisted by legal counsel, to assess the probability of  a 
claim being asserted and the probability of  an unfavorable  outcome. Based 
on these assessments, the financial  statements may include accrual of  an es-
timated loss, or disclosure of  the matter in notes to the financial  statements. 
The auditor's ability to evaluate the financial  statement presentation of  the 
indirect effects  of  an illegal act is limited. The auditor generally does not have 
the legal training or experience to second guess the opinion of  management 
and legal counsel. Therefore,  to a large extent the auditor acts as a broad con-
trol over the information  by evaluating management's disclosure of  the mat-
ter in relation to the lawyer's representations and the criteria in FASB No. 5. 
Other Compliance Auditing Requirements 
In performing  audits of  governmental units, not-for-profit  organizations, 
and certain other regulated companies, the auditor may perform  additional 
procedures to test compliance with laws and regulations. These additional 
procedures are beyond those required to comply with generally accepted au-
diting standards and are imposed by rule, law, or regulation. An example is 
the Single Audit Act of  1984 and Circular A-128, Audits  of  State  and  Local 
Governments,  issued by the Office  of  Management and Budget (OMB), 
which requires certain governmental units and non-governmental entities that 
receive federal  financial  assistance to engage an auditor to test and report on 
compliance with certain laws and regulations. Circular A-133, Audits  of  In-
stitutions  of  Higher  Education  and  Other Nonprofit  Institutions,  includes sim-
ilar requirements for  not-for-profit  organizations. These additional compliance 
auditing procedures are similar to agreed-upon procedures under the State-
ment on Standards for  Attestation Engagements [AICPA 1989]. The regu-
latory agency or legislative body decides which provisions of  laws and 
regulations need to be tested and the nature and extent of  the related pro-
cedures. The laws and regulations selected for  testing may not even have an 
indirect effect  on the entity's financial  statements. Examples of  laws and reg-
ulations that have no effect  on the financial  statements are contained in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of  1974. That act includes provi-
sions, such as bonding requirements, that govern the administration of  an 
employee benefit  plan. Violations of  such provisions have no direct or con-
tingent effect  on the financial  condition of  the plan. Any penalties are levied 
against the trustees. 
This agreed-upon procedures approach appears to represent the most cost-
beneficial  approach to developing expanded auditing requirements for  com-
pliance with laws, and regulations. Regulatory agencies or legislative bodies 
can contract for  the level of  assurance that is desired. 
Reporting Responsibilities 
What impact do illegal acts have on the auditor's reporting responsibili-
ties? The answer to this question is complex and may involve a number of 
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reporting vehicles. The reporting vehicle typically thought of  first  is the audit 
report. Generally, there is no need for  the auditor to modify  the audit report 
for  illegal acts, provided that the effects  of  those acts are appropriately pre-
sented or disclosed in the financial  statements. On the other hand, if  the au-
ditor concludes that illegal acts have a material effect  on the financial 
statements, and that effect  is not appropriately reflected,  the auditor should 
express a qualified  or adverse opinion because of  the lack of  conformity  with 
GAAP. If  management refuses  to accept the auditor's modified  report, the au-
ditor should withdraw from  the engagement and notify  the audit committee 
or the board of  directors of  the reasons for  withdrawal. 
One of  the objectives of  the expectation gap SASs was to improve the com-
munications to boards of  directors and audit committees to help them fulfill 
their financial  reporting and oversight responsibilities. Accordingly, SAS No. 
54 includes a requirement for  the auditor to make sure that the audit com-
mittee of  the entity is adequately informed  of  all but inconsequential illegal 
acts. Management may make the communication unless the act involves se-
nior management in which case the matter should be communicated directly 
by the auditor. Communication to regulatory agencies or other parties out-
side the entity is ordinarily not required under U.S. auditing standards, but 
there are the following  exceptions: 
• To a funding  agency or other specified  agency based on audit and 
reporting requirements of  law or regulation. 
• When the auditor responds to a Form 8-K filed  by the entity to re-
port a change in auditor. 
• To a successor auditor who makes inquiries in accordance with SAS 
No. 7, Communications  Between Predecessor  and  Successor  Auditors. 
• In response to a subpoena. 
The first  two of  these exceptions establish forms  of  direct reporting of  il-
legal acts to regulatory agencies. The first  allows regulatory agencies to di-
rectly receive information  regarding an entity's compliance with laws and 
regulations. Regulated entities can be required by law or regulation to en-
gage an auditor to issue compliance reports for  filing  with the agency. The 
reports may be based upon specified  procedures or procedures performed 
in the audit of  the entity's financial  statements. The reporting requirements 
of  an audit in accordance with Governmental  Auditing  Standards  (GAAS) is 
a prominent example of  this form  of  direct reporting. In these types of  en-
gagements, the auditor is required to issue an additional report on compli-
ance with laws and regulations based solely on the procedures required by 
GAAS. The report discloses all instances of  noncompliance that are esti-
mated to be material to the entity's financial  statements and all indications 
of  illegal acts that could result in criminal prosecution. Since the auditor or-
dinarily does not possess the expertise to evaluate whether an illegal act could 
result in criminal prosecution, he or she will normally report all illegal acts 
or possible illegal acts noted. 
The second exception results in a form  of  direct reporting when the au-
ditor decides to withdraw from  the engagement, because management's re-
sponse to an illegal act is not considered appropriate. If  management does 
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not accurately describe the relationship of  the illegal act to the change in au-
ditor in the Form 8-K, the auditor is required to describe the matter in a re-
sponse to the SEC. 
Future Issues 
Given the interest of  Congress and regulators in others' compliance with 
laws and regulations, the auditor's responsibilities for  illegal acts will no 
doubt be addressed again. Several issues appear relevant to any future  con-
sideration of  these responsibilities. These issues and their research implications 
are presented below. 
Can the Auditor's Detection Responsibilities be Expanded 
Under GAAS? 
Current professional  standards contain a relatively clear delineation of 
those illegal acts for  which the auditor has detection responsibility. The au-
ditor has a responsibility to design the audit to provide reasonable assurance 
of  detecting violations of  laws and regulations having a direct and material 
effect  on financial  statement amounts. Expanding the auditor's responsibil-
ity under GAAS would likely result in a level of  responsibility that is more 
difficult  to interpret. 
Any approach to expanding the auditor's responsibility must involve in-
creasing the auditor's responsibility for  the contingent tail. But this runs 
headlong into the auditor's limited legal expertise. It's clear that the auditor 
could design procedures to obtain reasonable assurance of  detecting viola-
tions of  certain laws and regulations that might have an indirect effect  on an 
entity's financial  statements. For example, the auditor of  a financial  institu-
tion could design effective  procedures for  testing compliance with the re-
quirement to submit currency transaction reports for  all large cash deposits. 
Designing effective  tests of  compliance for  indirect effect  laws and regula-
tions that have no reasonably objective criteria for  identifying  violations, sim-
ply would not be feasible.  Therefore,  any expanded responsibility would vary 
from  industry to industry and perhaps, even from  client to client in the same 
industry, depending on nature of  the laws and regulations that affect  the en-
tity. Using this approach, a clear-cut definition  of  the auditor's responsibility 
under GAAS could be achieved only by developing professional  standards 
or laws and regulations that set forth  specifically  those laws and regulations 
that the auditor would be required to test for  compliance. 
Another way to define  this expanded responsibility would be to include 
in professional  standards factors  that affect  the likelihood that the auditor will 
detect particular indirect effect  illegal act Such factors  would probably include 
the following: 
• The auditor's assessment of  the materiality of  the contingent effect 
of  the act on the entity's financial  statements (i.e., the materiality of 
the potential fine  or penalty). 
• The auditor's assessments of  the joint probability that the entity com 
mitted the act and a claim will be successfully  asserted. 
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• The auditor's ability to recognize the act (i.e., the extent of  the au-
ditor's knowledge of  the subject matter of  the law or regulation, and 
the complexity of  the law or regulation). 
• The extent of  the evidence that is available that would provide an 
indication that the act has occurred. 
This approach would leave the laws and regulations selected for  testing, 
as well as the nature and extent of  the procedures performed,  largely to the 
judgment of  the auditor. Therefore,  a "fuzzy"  definition  of  the auditor's de-
tection responsibility would result. 
Both of  these approaches to expanding the auditor's responsibility under 
GAAS suffer  from  another limitation. The degree of  assurance about the dis-
closure of  the effects  of  a violation of  a law or regulation would vary de-
pending on the nature of  the law or regulation. More assurance would be 
provided for  those laws and regulations for  which the auditor could design 
effective  compliance procedures. It's questionable whether these varying 
levels of  assurance could be effectively  communicated to users of  the audit 
report. One might also question whether it is cost-beneficial  to provide ad-
ditional assurance for  only certain types of  contingencies. However, research 
addressing these questions would be useful.  From a broad research per-
spective, it would also be useful  to have information  regarding the expecta-
tions of  users about the auditors responsibility to detect illegal acts. What 
assurances about compliance with laws and regulations do investors and reg-
ulators expect from  the audit in accordance with GAAS? 
Can the Auditor's Detection Responsibility be Expanded 
Outside of  GAAS? 
Expanding the responsibility of  the auditor outside of  GAAS is the approach 
that some regulatory agencies are currently taking or considering. As described 
above, laws and regulations are being developed that establish requirements 
for  reports by auditors on the application of  agreed-upon compliance proce-
dures. This approach to expanding the auditor's responsibility would appear 
to be more effective  and efficient  than expanding the auditor's responsibility 
under GAAS. Regulators can contract for  the level of  auditing desired regardless 
of  the effects  of  the laws or regulations on the entity's financial  statements. 
Also, all expansions of  audit requirements would go through normal legislative 
or administrative due process. 
This regulatory market for  compliance auditing would also appear to be 
a fruitful  subject for  research. The use of  agreed-upon procedures as a method 
to contract for  these services creates a unique market in which the user can 
contract for  a specific  level of  auditing. It provides a new setting for  exami-
nation of  agency relationships. 
Is There a Need to Expand the Auditor's Responsibility 
for  Direct Reporting of  Illegal Acts? 
As indicated above, the auditor already has a limited responsibility to re-
port illegal acts directly to regulators. Still, some regulatory agencies are re-
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questing that auditors assume more direct reporting responsibility. As a part 
of  the Financial Institutions Reform,  Recovery and Enforcement  Act of  1989, 
the Secretary of  the Treasury was instructed to study the feasibility  of  adopt-
ing regulations similar to those of  England's Banking Act 1987. That act 
charges the U.K. accounting profession  with the task of  developing standards 
that define  when the auditor should report management improprieties directly 
to the Bank of  England. If  auditors in the U.S. are required to communicate 
certain matters directly to regulators, how would this affect  their relationship 
with management? Would it affect  the level of  communication between the 
two parties? These would also appear to be interesting research questions. 
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